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This thesis (i) reviews constitutional and legislative
foundations for congressional control and oversight over
DoD, (ii) discusses methods of control and oversight, (iii)
documents a trend toward increasing control and oversight,
(iv) evaluates potential explanations for this trend, (v)
investigates the intent of line item specification and
restrictive language in authorization bills, appropriations
bills, and committee reports, and (vi) examines their impact
on DoN budget execution. It concentrates on DoN procurement
accounts for 1980-88 and Aircraft Procurement, Navy (APN)
for 1988. It concludes that (i) the intent of increased
oversight and control is to ensure that the will of Congress
is carried out by the Executive, (ii) congressional
budgetary decisions may impede DoN budget execution
efficiency and effectiveness, and (iii) the full impact of
these controls did not occur in APN in 1988 because negative
and unintended consequences were pointed out to Congress by
DoN and the controls were partially rescinded.
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This thesis investigates the intent of Congress in
applying increasingly restrictive language in authorization
bills, appropriations bills, and accompanying committee
reports, and the consequences of these actions for the
ability of the Department of the Navy (DON) to effectively
and efficiently manage its limited resources.
In recent legislation Congress has mandated a number of
spending floors (minimum amounts that must be spent on
specific projects) and has specifically fenced funds for
many DON acquisition programs. These actions severely
constrain DON budget discretion. The use of spending floors
in authorization and appropriations bills requires the DON
to spend up to a specific level regardless of impact on
program, mission, or budget. The use of fences which require
that certain funds be used only for specific, individual
weapons systems erodes the Navy's ability to move surplus
funds from one program to another program that may be in
need of additional funding. The existence of these floors
and fences promotes inefficiency in the use of limited
resources to achieve national defense goals.
The thesis reviews the basic constitutional and
legislative foundations for the control and oversight roles
of Congress in DON acquisitions. Second, it discusses the
various methods by which Congress exercises its control and
1
oversight responsibilities. Third, the trend toward
increasing control and oversight is documented. Fourth, it
evaluates potential explanations for this trend, focusing on
the use of spending floors, specific fences around program
funds, and other constraining legislative language. It
investigates the intent of including these constraints in
authorization bills, appropriations bills, and committee
reports. Finally, it examines the impact of constraints on
the Department of the Navy's budget execution and mission
accomplishment, and discusses the public policy consequences
of restrictive authorization and appropriation controls.
This thesis concentrates on the changes in language in
the DoN procurement accounts in the Department of Defense
appropriation and authorization acts for the period 1980-
1988 and the Aircraft Procurement, Navy account for budget
year 1988. Control is examined from the points of view of
staffs of congressional authorization and appropriation
committees, the staffs of the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) , the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , the
Office of the Navy Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) , Program Managers
for various DON acquisition programs, and the comptroller in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The interview
strategy and rationale for chosing interview subjects are
presented in Appendix A.
The thesis reaches the following conclusions: (i) the
intent of increased oversight and control is to ensure that
the intent of Congress is carried out by the executive
branch, (ii) the impact of congressional oversight and
control, and the detail to which this oversight and control
is exercised, appears to be counterproductive to the
achievement of the ends desired by Congress, because the
burden of excessive congressional management often impedes
the Navy acquisition and budget execution efficiency and
effectiveness, and (iii) the full impact of such negative
consequences did not actually occur in the specific case of
the Aircraft Procurement, Navy, in fiscal year 1988 only
because the negative, unintended consequences were pointed
out to the committees involved and Congress partially
rescinded the controls.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS
In the Constitution of the United States the people
granted to Congress the power
...to raise and support Armies... to provide and
maintain a Navy... to make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces... [and] to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. [They
further declared that]... the executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of
America ... [and that] he shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed. [Ref. 1]
To carry out these duties Congress authorized programs
and appropriated funds to enable the executive branch to
execute those programs. Until 1921 the individual government
agencies and departments submitted separate budget requests
through Treasury to Congress. Treasury did not analyze or
edit these requests and the President did not actively
participate in the budgetary process. In the early 1900' s,
large budget expenditures and budget deficits provided
impetus for reform. President Taft urged that
...the President should be responsible for preparing
a unified executive budget. The rational was motivated
by two themes: (1) economy and efficiency, and (2)
strengthening democracy. A president's budget would be
better able to plan government activities so that
maximum economy and efficiency were achieved. A
president's budget would also strengthen his power--thus
citizens could vote for or against a person who had
power to fulfill his promises ... President Taft's reforms
were largely enacted in 1921... The Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921 provided for a national budget and an
independent audit of government accounts. The law
specifically required the president to submit a budget
including estimates of expenditures, appropriations, and
receipts for the ensuing fiscal year. The new
legislation created the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) in
the treasury department ...[ it ] also created a
Congressional agency called the General Accounting
Office (GAO) to audit independently the government
accounts
.
[Ref . 2:p. 14]
This legislation was the first of a number of measures
instituted post World War I to increase the power and
effectiveness of the President in the budgetary process. The
Reorganization Act of 1939 created the Executive Office of
the President and transferred the BOB into that office. In
1969 the BOB was redesignated the Office of Management and
Budget (0MB) . All executive budget requests and recommended
legislation are forwarded to 0MB for review and approval.
With this organization the President can more effectively
ensure that the agencies and departments are following his
policies
.
The membership of the House of Representatives and the
Senate is established by the Constitution. The specific
internal organization and methods of conducting business are
not established by the Constitution and have evolved
significantly in the 20th century. The Legislative
Reorganization Acts of 1946 and 1970 and the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 influenced the
basic organization and methods of congressional budgeting.
The Legislative Reorganization Acts attempted to provide
increased efficiency in the legislative branch of the
government. Among other things the acts clarified the
number, composition, duties and authority of standing
committees and provided a statement of the oversight role to
be exercised by the committees. The committees of particular
relevance to the Department of the Navy (DON) are the House
and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services
.
[To the Committees on Appropriation] ...shall be
referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions,
memorials, and other matters relating to ... appropriation
of the revenue for the support of the government. [Ref
.
3:Sec. 102]
[To the Committees on Armed Services] ...shall be
referred all proposed legislation, messages, petitions,
memorials, and other matters relating to the following
subjects :
1. Common defense generally.
2. The War Department and the Military Establishment
generally
.
3. The Navy Department and the Naval Establishment
generally
4. Soldiers' and sailors' homes.
5. Pay, promotion, retirement, and other benefits and
privileges of members of the armed forces
.
6. Selective Service.
7. Size and composition of the Army and Navy.




10. Maintenance and operation of the Panama Canal,
including the administration, sanitation, and government
of the Canal Zone. [Senate only]
11. Conservation, development, and use of naval
petroleum and oil shale reserves.
12. Strategic and critical materials necessary for the
common defense.
13. Scientific research and development in support of
the armed services
.
[House only] [Ref. 3 : Sec . 102]
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 delineated
the legislative oversight responsibilities of these standing
committees. Section 136 stated
...to assist the Congress in appraising the
administration of the laws and in developing such
amendments or related legislation as it may deem
necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall exercise continuous
watchfulness of the execution by the administrative
agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of
which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and
for that purpose, shall study all reports and data
submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the
executive branch of the Government. [Ref. 3 : Sec . 136]
[To this the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 added] Such committees may carry out
the required analysis, appraisal, and evaluation
themselves, or by contract, or may require a Government
agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the
Congress. Such committees may rely on such techniques as
pilot testing, analysis of costs in comparison with
benefits, or provision for evaluation after a defined
period of time. [Ref. 4:p. 94]
In addition, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 added
...that it is essential--
(1) to assure effective congressional control over the
budgetary process;
(2) to provide for the congressional determination
each year of the appropriate level of Federal revenues
and expenditures;
(3) to provide a system of impoundment control;
(4) to establish national budget priorities; and
(5) to provide for the furnishing of information by
the executive branch in a manner that will assist the
Congress in discharging its duties. [Ref. 4:p. 62]
The 1974 Act modified the congressional budget process
to provide congressional control over the impoundment of
funds by the executive branch, and established the
Congressional Budget Office and Committees on the Budget in
each House.
Two recently established committees have taken an active
role in providing oversight over national security and
defense programs. The Committee of Government Affairs in the
Senate and the Committee of Government Operations in the
House have, among other duties, the "duty of ... studying the
efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of all agencies and
departments of the Government ...." [Ref . 4: p. 23] These
committees have interpreted this as giving them sweeping
oversight authority.
Congressional micromanagement , detailed decision making
on issues of executive administrative discretion, of the
defense budget by the committees of Congress noted above is
significant in volume and degree. Other committees, such as
those on Intelligence, also play a role in dictating
conditions for DoD budget execution. This thesis
concentrates on controls implemented in the budget process,
although much micromanagement also takes place independent
of the budget as well.
III. METHODS OF EXERCISING CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
AND OVERSIGHT
A. CONTROL
The primary methods by which Congress exercises
budgetary control over DoD and DoN procurement are through
appropriation and authorization acts, general legislation,
committee reports, and colloquia. These methods form a
spectrum of control from the most binding to the least
binding on DoD budget execution.
1 . impropriation Bills
An appropriation is an act of Congress that permits
federal agencies to incur obligations and to make
payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. An
appropriation act is a statute that provides funds for
federal programs. An appropriation act generally follows
enactment of authorizing legislation unless the
authorizing legislation itself provides the budget
authority. [Ref. 5: p. 440]
Appropriations for DON procurement are contained in




An authorization act is substantive legislation
enacted by Congress that sets up or continues legal
operation of a federal program or agency either
indefinitely or for a specific period of time or
sanctions a particular type of obligation or expenditure
within a program. Authorizing legislation is usually a
prerequisite for subsequent appropriations or other
kinds of budget authority to be contained in
appropriation acts. Such legislation may limit the
amount of budget authority to be provided subsequently
or may authorize the appropriation of "such sums as may
be necessary ." [Ref . 5: p. 440]
Authorization for DOD budget execution and
procurement is contained in the annual National Defense
Authorization Acts.
3 . General Legislation
Whereas the authorization and appropriation bills
control what is procured by DoD and how much can be spent,
Congress has also enacted a series of laws to control
acquisitions. Examples of these laws are the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947 (with subsequent revisions) , the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, and the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984. In 1974 The Office of Federal
Procurement Policy Act "...established the Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management
and Budget to improve the economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness of the procurement processes by providing
overall direction of procurement policies, regulations,
procedures, and forms." [Ref. 6:p. 90] Subject to prior
consultation with the Committees of Government Operations in
the House and Senate [Ref. 7] the OFPP issues Federal
Acquisition Regulations (FARS) . These acts and FARS
influence budget execution significantly, but the focus of
this thesis is on general budgeting rather than specific
procurement controls.
4 . Cozomittee Reports
When a standing committee of either House of
Congress submits a bill to the floor it also provides a
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report indicating, among other things, the background of the
bill, an explanation of the provisions in the bill, special
concerns of the committee (including dissenting opinions),
requests for reports and data from executive agencies, and a
detailed breakdown of programs and funding accounts.
Although these committee reports do not have the force of
law [Ref. 8], they do express the intent of the standing
committees; the executive is expected to adhere to the
provisions of the reports. Complications often arise because
bills may be accompanied by conflicting reports: one from
the standing committee in the House, a second from the
standing committee in the Senate, and a third from the joint
House and Senate conference committee. The conference
committee report usually carries the most weight . To further
complicate control, approved programs must be funded by the
appropriations committees. Consequently, there are six often
conflicting reports that require DoD compliance.
5. Colloquia
A colloquium is a prearranged or staged discussion
in a public congressional forum. By engaging in a
colloquium, interested members go on record as having made
certain statements that can be quoted latter when needed to
strengthen an argument, request or demand regarding
congressional intent. [Ref. 9]
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B. OVERSIGHT
Oversight is exercised in several ways. First, and
perhaps foremost, Congress studies "...all reports and data
submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive
branch of the Government ." [Ref . 3 : Sec 136] Various acts,
including the annual authorization and appropriation acts,
mandate the submission of a host of reports. These run the
spectrum from pre-spending reports which must be submitted
prior to the commencement of programs or program milestones
in support of congressional ex-ante controls to post-
spending status reports which support congressional ex-post
controls
.
Congress also has the power to "carry out the required
analysis, appraisal, and evaluation themselves, or by
contract, or may require a Government Agency to do so and
furnish a report thereon to the Congress [Ref. 4:p. 94] ." To
this end, committee staff members, the Congressional Budget
Office, the General Accounting Office, Inspectors General
Office, and other audit agencies perform independent
investigations to assure the accountability desired by
members of Congress. On site investigations by members of
Congress and their investigative teams are commonplace for
DoD.
Standing committees also are empowered to require the
appearance of any person to present testimony before them on
items within the committees' jurisdiction.
12
C. BUDGET REPROGRAMMING- -CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT
Once funds have been appropriated to an account or a
statutory subdivision of an account, the executive cannot
use those funds for any other account or spend less than the
appropriated amount for that account without subsequent
congressional approval. Movements of funds from one account
to another are called transfers. To transfer funds between
accounts DoD must either have been given statutory transfer
authority in the appropriation bill or obtain congressional
approval for the specific transfer. [Ref. 10:p. 6-11] In
general, the executive cannot spend less than the
appropriated amount for that account unless Congress
approves a rescission request or reprograms funds. [Ref. 4:p.
99]
The movement of funds between programs within an account
is called reprogramming . Non-statutory agreements among the
appropriations committees, authorization committees, and
executive departments and agencies govern the movement of
funds within accounts. Under these agreements some
reprogramming actions require prior approval of
congressional committees while others simply require that
committees be given timely notification. [Ref. 10 :p. 6-11]
Transfer and reprogramming rules provide congressional
control over most DoD transfers and reprogramming actions,
and attempt to enable effective oversight.
13
The controls noted above are used to influence DoD and
Don budget execution to conform to the will of Congress. The
President proposes the Budget, but Congress enacts it,
holding the executive accountable for execution in
conformance with congressional program and spending
preferences. Evidence indicates that congressional control
of executive budgeting has become increasingly restrictive
in the past decade.
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IV. THE TREND TOWARD INCREASED CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT
A trend toward increased congressional budgetary
oversight and control and a shift toward increased use of
statutory language to effect oversight and control is
documented in this chapter. The trend may be demonstrated by
examining the length and content of authorization and
appropriation bills for defense over time. Figures 1 and 2
show the increasing trend in the number of pages in the
bills, the number of pages of general provisions, and the
numbers of general provisions included as statutory law
[Ref . 11] . Much control that formerly was included only in
the non-statutory committee reports is now written into the
language of the actual bills.
An examination of the procurement accounts for the three
services in appropriations bills reveals two interesting
developments. First, the four Navy procurement accounts
(Aircraft Procurement, Navy, Weapons Procurement, Navy,
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, and Other Procurement,
Navy), which previously, at least since the late 1950' s, had
been authorized and funded as lump sums, began to be
subdivided into line items. In 1973, the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) account included two specific
programs by line item. By 1985 this list grew to 20
programs. In 1983, the Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN)
account mentioned 15 specific programs by line item. In the
15
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same year the Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account was
divided into seven categories by line item. In the ensuing
years the WPN account has been subdivided into as many as 40
line items. In 1988, the aircraft account contained 16
tightly fenced programs within the overall procurement
account. This increase of line item specificity is displayed
in Figure 3. The second observation is that this line item
specificity does not exist in the procurement accounts for
the Army or the Air Force. In 1988, the Navy was again
singled out for tighter control.
Another congressional control indicator is the number of
reports required by Congress from DoD as presented in Figure
4 [Ref. 12 :p. 61] . The increasing number of reports are
evidence of tighter ex-ante control and ex-post oversight.
A final indicator of congressional control is the
increased number of detailed changes made to specific budget
items in the DoD portion of the President's Budget Request,
as presented in Figure 5 [Ref. 12:p.61].
Changes in the procurement accounts for the Navy
demonstrate a shift from nonstatutory control methods, such
as colloquia and committee reports, to statutory control
methods of authorization and appropriation language and line
program identification and funding.
The data presented in this chapter indicate the increase
in congressional budget control over DoN execution and the
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Figure 5. Line Item Adjustments to DoD Budget
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forms it has taken. The next chapter attempts to explain why
congressional control has increased in the past decade.
22
V. FACTORS TO EXPLAIN INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL
CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT
To identify factors to explain the increased control
and oversight interviews were conducted with staffs of
congressional authorization and appropriation committees,
the staffs of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) , the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , the Office of the Navy
Comptroller (NAVCOMPT) , Program Managers and comptrollers
for various DON acquisition programs, and the comptroller in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The interviews were
structured as shown in Appendix A. Numerous, less
structured, follow up telephone calls were also made to
these and other officials.
Interviewees were asked to explain the congressional
control trend over the last decade, specifically the use of
spending floors, specific fences around program funds, and
other tightly constrained legislative language. Their
responses can be distilled into the following set of
factors to explain the increase in control.
A. Partisan politics within Congress and between Congress
and the Executive.
B. Congressional budgetary politics and processes:
1. Reduced power of committee chairmen and increased
relative power of committee members, subcommittee chairmen,
subcommittee members, and non-committee members/
23
2.
Power struggles between standing committees in
both Houses;
3. Pork barrel political pressures;
4. Increased public exposure for members of Congress;
5. Increased size of congressional committee staffs.
C. Executive accountability:
1 . Refusal by high level DoD and DoN officials to
negotiate or prioritize programs in the DoD budget request;
2. Loss of congressional confidence in DoD and DoN
leadership ability;
3 Failure of DoN to comply with the spirit and
intent of report language;
4 . Ineffective DoD and DoN budget and program
execution
.
D. Budget growth and control:
1 The significant size of the increment in the
defense budget proposed by the President in the 1980' s;
2. Pressure to reduce the growing deficit.
Each of these factors is elaborated in this chapter.
This analysis is augmented by the views of defense budget
policy critics in addition to those interviewed specifically
for this thesis.
A. PARTISAN POLITICS WITHIN CONGRESS AND BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE EXECUTIVE
Partisan politics appears to be a factor explaining some
degree of increased congressional control over DoD in cases
24
where the majority party in one house is different from that
in the other, or where the party of the executive is
different from that of the legislature as a whole. Partisan
politics is a reflection of differing political ideologies.
If the Congress and the executive have opposing ideologies.
Congress finds it necessary to spell out in great detail
what it is that it wants the executive to execute, because
congressional budget priorities differ from those of the
President. Further, even though the will and intent of
Congress may have been articulated through committee reports
and colloquia. Congress may find it necessary to include
detailed language in authorization and appropriation bills
to ensure that the executive complies and is accountable for
deviation from congressional intent.
B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY POLITICS AND PROCESSES
1 . Reduced power of committee chairmen and increased
relative power of committee members, subcommittee chairmen,
sijbcommittee members, and non-committee members
"During the early 1970' s .. .power was dispersed from
committee chairs (no longer guaranteed by seniority) to a
proliferation of subcommittees (all committees had to have
them) and new staff." [Ref. 5:p. 192] This erosion of the
power of Congressional leadership and committee chairman has
given junior congressmen the opportunity to exercise greater
influence, an opportunity they have seized aggressively,
particularly in the House. As each member seeks to make his
25
mark, he delves further into the details of programs and
budgets. Erosion of congressional leadership has also led to
an explosion of floor debate in both the House and the
Senate
.
Between 1970 and 1979 the House debated an average
of 20 amendments to the defense authorization bill each
year and the Senate debated 24 amendments ... In 1986
alone the House debated 116 amendments and the Senate
debated 83. In practical terms, this meant that
representatives debated nearly 12 amendments each day
the FY 1987 authorization was on the floor of the House
and senators debated 11. Moreover, because most
amendments do not pas first through the committee
process, often the only legislative scrutiny they
receive comes during the brief time they are considered
on the floor. [Ref. 12:p. 60]
This situation is exacerbated when last minute compromises
are made on the floor in the rush to pass continuing
resolutions or omnibus appropriations bills.
2 . Power struggles between standing committees in both
Houses
Power struggles between standing committees, not
only between the houses, but, also within each house, appear
to contribute to the increased oversight and control exerted
by each of the committees involved. The major players in DoD
procurement are the Appropriations, Budget, and Armed
Services Committees of both houses, the Government
Operations Committee in the House and the Government Affairs
Committee in the Senate. Non-defense committees have become
increasingly involved in defense matters. "Currently, 10
committees in the Senate and 11 in the House have standing
jurisdiction over some aspect of defense policy." [Ref.
26
12 :p. 60] The fiercest competition is between the
authorizing and appropriating committees. "A spreading
overlap between the committees responsible for authorizing
and appropriating defense funds has only exacerbated the
budgetary chaos of Capitol Hill: The Armed Services
Committees mark up the defense request at the appropriators'
level of line-item detail, while the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees appropriate funds that were never authorized."
[Ref. 13:p. 2303] Not only do the authorizers and
appropriators compete, but the House Governmental Operations
Committee and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee have
increased their scrutiny of defense affairs due to a
perception that the authorizing committees are not tough
enough in their scrutiny of defense affairs [Ref. 14 :p. 21].
In turn, this challenge to their competence encourages the
authorizers to redouble their efforts.
3 . Pork barrel political pressures
This brings up the issue of pork, a rather negative
term for forces central to our democratic form of
government. Pork barrel refers to government appropriations
for political patronage, such as those for local
improvements to please legislators' constituents. Pork is
the money, jobs, etc., received through pork barrel
appropriations. A primary concern for congressmen is
reelection. To be reelected they must attempt to give their
constituents what they want, from the construction or
27
maintenance of military bases in their districts to the
granting of defense contracts to businesses in their
districts. To ensure that these benefits accrue to their
districts it may be necessary to resort to very specific
statutory language rather that leaving budget execution
decisions to the service departments.
4 . Increased pxiblic exposure for members of Congress
Increased public exposure for members of Congress,
in part resulting from greater media exposure, has
challenged them to become expert on more topics, to become
more expert on specific topics, and to create more impact
for constituents back home. This pressure may lead members
of Congress to dig more deeply into programs and budgets to
find items of sensational value, and then to create fixes
for these problems to demonstrate leadership and ability to
force DoD to be more efficient.
5. Increased size of congressional committee staffs
The increased size of congressional staffs may have
contributed to the increased level of both oversight and
control. Augmentation of staffs may be viewed as only a
response by Congress to provide the means for dealing with
the demands presented by the other issues listed above. The
same could be said for the creation of the Congressional
Budget Office in 1974 to provide information which will
assist committees in the discharge of their duties [Ref.
4:p. 69] . It also may be argued that these organizations,
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once established, gain incentives of their own to control
DoD budget execution. Staff expertise in analyzing defense
issues has grown over time and has become a resource for




Refusal by high level DoD and DoN officials to
negotiate or prioritize programs in the DoD budget request
Refusal by high level DoD and DoN officials,
specifically Casper Weinberger (SECDEF) and John Lehman
(SECNAV) , to negotiate or prioritize items in the DoD budget
request, especially in the mid 1980' s, forced the
appropriate standing committees in Congress to analyze the
DoD budget request more closely, develop independent means
to gather information on DoD plans, programs, and policy,
demand more reports and testimony from subordinate officials
in DoD, and, finally, to spell out in excruciating detail in
statutory law its directions to DoD.
2 . Loss of congressional confidence in DoD and DoN
leadership ability
A loss of confidence in DoD and DoN leadership
ability by Congress may have created a vacuum which
Congressmen rushed to fill. Loss of credibility resulted
from a perception that program sponsors and program managers
either did not know their programs well or were
intentionally misrepresenting them to gain budgetary
advantage. Further, some congressional staff members
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indicated that senior DoD and DoN officials were unable to
effectively plan and execute the overall acquisition
program. Given this perception, it followed that Congress
should step in to provide management assistance.
3 . Failure of DoN to comply with the spirit and intent
of report language
Failure of DoN to comply with the spirit and intent
of committee report language in some instances may have
caused Congress to include more report language in the
actual bills. This theme was voiced not only by
congressional staff members and officials at CBO, but also
acknowledged by members of the executive. The three service
departments are described by some congressional staff as the
three D's: Dumb, Defiant, and Devious. The DoN is
characterized as a defiant budget adversary
.
[Ref . 15]
4 . Ineffective DoD and DoN budget and program execution
Ineffective program management and sponsorship,
contributed to in part by the turnover of military
personnel, was cited by congressional committee staff
members as a cause of increased control . Some members of
Congress and their staffs see themselves as the only
continuity in some of the programs and take it upon
themselves to more closely manage these programs . Such
management takes the form of tightly constrained funding
language, additional reports required, more on site
investigative presence, and detailed program and policy
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guidance written into in appropriation and authorization
reports
.
D. BUDGET GROWTH AND CONTROL
1
.
The significamt size of the increment in the defense
budget proposed by the President in the 1980'
s
The size of the budget increment proposed for
defense by the Reagan administration in the early 1980' s was
confronted in one way or another by most members of
Congress. It became more important for many to scrutinize
the DoD budget, if for no other reason than to ensure that
constituents received their fair share of increased budget
authority and spending. Also, congressional concern for
efficiency and effectiveness in a such a rapid increase of
defense capability may have caused increased congressional
control
2 . Pressure to reduce the growing deficit
Pressure to reduce the growing deficit and the
threat of GRH sequestration forced Congress to address the
difficult issue of deciding where to allocate the
increasingly scarce funds. The desire to make the right
decisions and preserve favorite programs lead to an
aggressive search for information. Information is power. And
with this information the committees analyze budget requests
more thoroughly to make decisions at a more detailed level.
Having made these decisions, over OSD and DoN objections, it
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becomes important to include language to compel adherence to
the authorization and appropriation legislation.
It is difficult to isolate and weight the factors
that have led to increased congressional control of DoD and
DoN with great precision. Most of the factors mentioned
appear to have contributed in some measure to the need
perceived by Congress to increase the amount and types of
budget control . The next chapter attempts to evaluate some




VI. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, DON IMPACT
AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSEQUENCES
The intent of some proportion of the increased
congressional control and oversight is to ensure that the
will of Congress is carried out by the executive branch.
This is in keeping with the democratic foundations of our
form of government and the constitutional role for Congress
explained in chapter II. The impact of control and the
detail to which it is exercised may be counterproductive to
the achievement of the ends desired by Congress. The burden
of excessive congressional management inevitably impedes to
some extent the executive in delivering the desired products
efficiently and effectively. However, congressional control
may in some instances improve DoD products and increase DoD
effectiveness
.
In light of the longer trend toward increasing control,
and given the specific, proposed increases in control being
considered by the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees for the 1988 bills, Deputy Secretary of Defense,
William H Taft, IV, wrote a series of letters to the
chairmen of these committees to argue against the proposed
increases in control and in favor of increased DoD
management flexibility. He claimed that the degree and types
of control proposed would seriously reduce the ability of
DoD to efficiently and effectively perform its duties. The
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Secretary' s arguments are summarized below and the text of
portions of his letters is included in Appendix B.
Taft explained that proposed reprogramming restrictions
would increase the "administrative burden on both Congress
and the DoD... hamper efficient program management, and
prevent quick response to ever changing program
requirements, thereby causing program delays and increased
costs." [Ref. 16 :p. 9] He also explained that the proposed
use of line item authorization and sub-divided
appropriations "would result in numerous formal
reprogramming actions, impede timely program execution,
generate increased workload for DoD and congressional
staffs, and impair the Department's ability to respond to
crisis situations." [Ref. 16:Encl. 1, p. 2]
Several of the restrictive provisions cited by the
Secretary found their way into the Department of Defense
Appropriation Act for FY 1988 and the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1988-1989. This leads to the
question of whether inefficiencies and ineffectiveness
predicted by the Secretary actually occurred during the
execution of the budget during fiscal year 1988? Did
Congress actually get what they asked for in the most
efficient manner? In the next chapter the thesis analyzes
Aircraft Procurement, Navy provisions in the authorization
and appropriation bills for 1988 in an attempt to answer
these questions.
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VII. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER FISCAL YEAR 1988
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY
In both the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for
1988 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989, Congress significantly increased the
detail and restrictiveness of language in the Aircraft
Procurement, Navy (APN) account. This chapter documents the
change in language and format of the applicable sections of
the acts and explains how that change increases control.
Second, it explains the intent of Congress in this
particular case of increased control. Third, it attempts to
determine which of the factors for increasing control
articulated in Chapter V appear to have been applicable in
the FY 1988 APN case. Fourth, the impact of the increased
control on the ability of the DoN to effectively and
efficiently execute the aircraft acquisition programs is
assessed.
A. EXPLANATION OF INCREASED CONTROLS IN THE FY 1988 APN
ACCOUNT
For at least the past 20 years the APN authorization and
appropriation bill language stated the account amount as a
single lump sum. In both the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 and the Department of
Defense Appropriation Bill for 1988, this account was
modified to show sixteen individual programs by line item.
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The format and language were initiated by the House Armed
Services Committee. The text of applicable sections of these
two bills is presented in Appendix C.
Specification of funding for particular aircraft
programs as a statutory subdivisions of the appropriation
account prevents the DOD from transferring any funds from
that aircraft program to another aircraft program without
first obtaining congressional approval, or exercising the
limited statutory transfer granted in section 8015 of the
Appropriations Act. However, even the statutory transfer
authority granted in section 8015 of the Appropriations Act
could not be exercised for these programs because of the
specific "only for" language written into the law. Further,
all of the funds appropriated for a program must be spent on
that program unless Congress approves a rescission request
submitted by the President. The amounts specified in FY 1988
for each program and the method of specification created de
facto spending ceilings and floors.
B. INTENT OF THE LINE ITEM FORMAT
The intent of the line item format as explained by
congressional staff [Ref. 17] and certain officials within
the Navy [Ref. 18] was to ensure that the DoN did not short
change these particular programs by transferring or
reprogramming funds out of them into other programs or other
procurement accounts.
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C. REASONS FOR EXERCISING INCREASED CONTROL FOR APN IN FY
1988
A number of factors have been proposed in this thesis
to explain increased control being exercised by Congress.
Each of these is examined below to determine which most
accurately explain the reasons for the increased control and
oversight afforded by the change in format in the APN
account for 1988. It is argued that the main reasons
explaining why Congress chose to exercise greater control
over the APN procurement account are (i) failure of DoD and
DoN to comply with the spirit and intent of report language,
(ii) the requirement to enforce the difficult spending
decisions dictated by public pressure to reduce the deficit
and the threat of GRH sequestration, and (iii) the belief by
congressional staff that NAVCOMPT was exerting undue
influence over the procurement policies in the DoN, at the




When the Reagan administration assumed office in
1981, John Lehman, the newly appointed Secretary of the
Navy, presented the blueprint for the 600 ship Navy. This
blue print included 15 deployable carrier battle groups and
14 active and 2 inactive airwings. To enhance the strike
capability of Navy carrier airwings he proposed a new
airwing configuration consisting, in part, of 20 F/A-18 dual
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purpose aircraft and 20 A-6 strike aircraft. Such a plan
required significant investment in procurement of both ships
and aircraft. The plan emphasized shipbuilding during the
earlier years and then began the increase of funding for
aircraft as the shipbuilding funding stream ramped down. The
success of the plan rested heavily on continued real growth
of the defense budget. [Ref. 17]
The expectation of increased funding in the out
years for all DoD procurement plans was set out in DoD
planning, programming, and budgeting. Figure 6 shows these
programmed acquisitions [Ref. 19]. When the President
submits his budget request to Congress the budget request
typically includes estimates for the upcoming fiscal year
and the next four out-years. Figure 6 shows the estimates
for DoD procurement as presented in the budget requests for
fiscal years 1983 through 1989, as well as the actual
amounts appropriated for budget fiscal years 1982 through
1988. The projected increases in the out-years were not
approved. However, DoD programming and planning continued to
assume that increased out-year funding would be appropriated
by Congress. In fact, until the formulation of the 1990-91
budget request, DoD planning and programming continued to
reflect what Congress viewed as unrealistic funding in the
out-years. It might be argued that the budget estimates in
the President's budget request were not the actual numbers
on which DoD was actually basing its acquisition strategy,
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DOD PROCUREMENT, ESTIMATES AND ACTUAL
1969
Figure 6. DoD Procurement, Estimates and Actual
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rather they were simply part of a budgetary ploy to justify
higher appropriations for defense. However, the estimates
were derived from the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP), the
central planning document for DoD acquisitions.
Consequently, from the perspective of Congress, DoD's
persistent assumption of increased out year funding in DoD
programming and planning was leading to an overall
acquisition strategy that was impossible to execute given
the limited funding that Congress was most likely to
appropriate in the out years
.
Congressional and executive concern over the
mounting budget deficit in FY 1985 and subsequently and loss
of Presidential political leverage in Congress halted the
real growth of the defense budget and resulted in relatively
flat budgets in real dollar terms beginning in 1986,
However, DoN shipbuilding funding did not taper off in 1986-
88. In fact, new starts of carriers and destroyers were
accelerated. Although shipbuilding requires relatively low
outlays initially, the outlays in the out years increase
rapidly. The Navy's decision to pursue the shipbuilding in
the face of flat budgets effectively doomed the 16 proposed
airwings . The budget request for 1986 included $12.3 billion
for 320 aircraft. Testimony presented by the DoN called for
increasing aircraft procurement to about 380 aircraft per
year to maintain the required quantity, age, and quality of
aircraft to support the 16 proposed airwings. [Ref. 17]
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In light of the budget realities, however, the
procurement plans submitted in the following years included
less than 300 aircraft in 1987, 1988, and 1989, and less
than 200 by 1990. [Ref. 17] Buying fewer aircraft not only
could cause a degradation in the combat capability of the
airwings, but would result in higher unit costs due to less
than efficient production rates.
The House Armed Services Committee expressed the
following concerns over the condition of naval aviation in
its committee report accompanying the 1988 authorization
bill to the floor:
Navy testimony indicated that the 15 deployable
aircraft carriers have been fully funded, are under
construction and that adequate numbers of combat
aircraft are available to meet the airwing requirements
for the 15 aircraft carriers. However, the committee is
concerned about several issues that are apparent in the
fiscal year 1988 Defense budget request.
First, the mix of combat aircraft within the 15
deployable airwings is not adequate and, according to a
Congressional Budget Office analysis, shortfalls of
aircraft are apparent in the medium attack and
electronic warfare roles. Because no reasonable
substitutes for these aircraft exist, carrier airwing
capabilities will not satisfy Navy requirements.
Second, the overall age of Navy aircraft continues
to increase because the Navy is not buying sufficient
aircraft to reduce average ages to acceptable levels.
Although the average age for fighter and attack aircraft
is decreasing, this is due solely to the procurement of
F/A-18 aircraft at rates sufficient to offset the
increasing age of the other fighter and attack aircraft
that are being retained.
Third, the committee is seriously concerned with the
inconsistency in the budget in the form of drastic
reductions to aircraft modifications. Navy testimony
indicated that although the aircraft average age is
increasing, acceptable options exist. For example, the
alternative to replacing older aircraft with new
aircraft is to restore, extend or improve the capability
of existing aircraft through modification programs.
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However, the budget request would have aged the
inventory and, at the same time, reduced aircraft
modifications by more than one-half from last year's
level. This is not an acceptable strategy and can not be
supported
.
As such, the Navy must strike an executable balance
between procurement of new aircraft and modification of
existing aircraft. Future procurement efforts should be
directed toward providing a proper mix of combat
aircraft for the 15 deployable airwings
.
[Ref . 20:p. 14]
Similar concern was expressed by the Senate Armed
Services Committee in the report accompanying its proposed
1988 authorization bill to the floor of the Senate:
While the Navy decided to accelerate the procurement
of aircraft carriers, it chose to stretch out the
procurement of combat aircraft... A third of all the
combat aircraft in last year' s Five Year Defense Plan
were removed from the budget at the same time that the
size of the fleet is expanding. These specific stretch
outs will result in an older fleet [of aircraft] . [Ref.
21:p. 10]
The House Appropriation Committee expressed the
following view about the naval aviation procurement strategy
in its report accompanying the 1988 appropriation bill to
the floor of the House:
The Committee, in the past, has raised its concern
over the Navy's large number of different aircraft
production lines, particularly when the procurement of
aircraft at less-than efficient production rates results
in higher unit costs. [Ref. 22:p. 143]
In addition to these factors, it appeared to
professional staff on the House Armed Services Committee
that the DoD and DoN were systematically reprogramming funds
out of the APN account to fund programs in other accounts,
such as submarine programs, shipbuilding, CHAMPUS, and
overseas station allowances. Table 1 list details the net
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transfer of funds out of the APN funds appropriated in each









1986 12 .0 M
1987 33.0 M
It is important to remember that the APN funds
appropriated in 1985 are available for obligation, transfer,
or reprogramming for three years. The actual transfers could
have taken place in 1985, 1986, or 1987, the year during
which the 1988 authorization and appropriation bills were
being considered by Congress. The $724.4 million transferred
out of APN for 1985 represented about 7% of the APN account.
It was within this environment of perceived neglect of APN
in Navy priorities that the appropriation and authorization




Evaluation of DoN budget actions relative to
proposed factors explaining increased control
a. Partisan politics within Congress and between
Congress and the Executive
Partisan politics did not appear to be a factor
in the increased congressional control over the APN account,
nor was it mentioned as such during the interviews conducted
by the author. This does not rule out partisan effects.
However, interviewees in Congress and DoN did not place
emphasis on this factor to explain why APN was more
constrained in FY 1988.
b. Congressional budgetary politics and processes
(1) Reduced power of committee chairmen and
increased relative power of committee members, subcommittee
chairmen, subcommittee members, and non-members. No evidence
was found to support this hypothesis in the specific case of
the increased control exercised in the APN account. The
additional specification within the APN account was written
by committee staff and approved by the committee chairmen.
(2) Power struggles between standing committees
in both Houses . Power struggles between the Armed Services
Committees and the Appropriations Committees of both houses
are an ongoing phenomena. Senate Armed Services Committee
staff stated that anticipated differences between the
authorizers and appropriators over A-6F funding added
impetus to the line item format of the authorization bill.
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Indeed, the appropriation bill as passed by both houses
illustrates this conflict. It stated, "That notwithstanding
section 111 (e) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180) $609,917,000
is available for the procurement of 12 A-6F aircraft ," [Ref
.
24] This language indicates the perceived need for the
authorizing committee to control the actions of the
appropriations committee through bill language.
(3) Pork barrel political pressures. 'Little
evidence to support this as a causal factor in the case of
the controls in the APN account was found. In fact, several
interviewees expressed that pork was not the cause,
including officials in the DoN who, other things equal,
might be eager to claim that pork was the case. [Ref. 18 and
25] However, other DoN officials, including some in
NAVCOMPT, believe that the protection of pork projects still
may have been an important factor in the APN FY 1988
controls for several programs.
(4) Increased public exposure for members of
Congress. No evidence was found to support this hypothesis
in the specific case of APN. In fact the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act for 1988 was included in a 450
page Joint Resolution passed 83 days after the beginning of
the fiscal year, three days before Christmas. The provisions
in the APN account received little exposure in Congress, and
much less exposure to the public.
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(5) Increased size of congressional committee
staffs. Increased size of congressional committee staffs has
provided to committees the personnel resources necessary to
more closely control and oversee the formulation and
execution of the DoD budget. Increased size allows the staff
to specialize, which, in turn, may promote competitiveness
within the staff, competitiveness which often mirrors that
within DoD. The influence of factions within the various
staffs, as well and within DoD and DoN, appears to have been
a factor in the 1988 Acts as each faction sought to protect
items within its area of responsibility and expertise,
c. Executive accountability
(1) Refusal by high level DoD and DoN officials
to negotiate or prioritize programs in the DoD budget
request. Although this issue was raised by Congress as an
explanation for increased control in the early years of the
Reagan administration, it was not voiced by those
interviewed as being a factor in the 1988 bills.
(2) Loss of congressional confidence in DoD and
DoN leadership ability. Two recurring themes were noted by
interviewees in this area: a leadership void in the DoN, and
failure of the submitted annual budget request to recognize
future budgetary realities in a realistic manner.
After the departure of Secretary Lehman
there existed in some spheres of Congress the impression
that there was a leadership void in the DoN and that the
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void was being filled by various independent units of the
organization; the most evidently powerful being the Office
of the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) . There was concern
among congressional staff that NAVCOMPT was exerting "undue"
influence over the procurement policies in the DoN, at the
expense of procurement program sponsors and program
managers. [Ref. 17] Statutory line items in the APN account
were used in an attempt to rein in what was perceived as too
much power being exercised by NAVCOMPT. The line item format
for FY 1988 was initiated by a staff member on the HASC with
the support and consent of some Navy sponsors of the
aviation programs
.
[Ref . 18] This suggests that internal
competition within the DoN may be a significant factor in
explaining the increase in congressional budget control.
As depicted in Figure 6, the estimates for
out year spending presented in the FY 1986-88 budget
requests were consistently unrealistic. By 1985, from the
view of Congress, it should have been clear that the
increased spending in the out years for aircraft would not
materialize, but the DoN estimates included in the budget
request continued to reflect anticipated increased spending
in the out years. Congressional members and staff judged
that DoN leadership had failed to base the aircraft
acquisition strategy on realistic budgetary expectations
and, consequently, direct congressional intervention was
needed.
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(3) Failure of DoN to comply with the spirit
and intent of report language. The DoN has the reputation
among some staffers in Congress as a defiant service in
terms of budget strategy. The fact that the DoN transferred
7% of the APN funds for budget year 1985 to other
appropriations was viewed by some in Congress, both
authorizers and appropriators, as further proof that the DoN
was defying the spirit and intent of Congress, even though
the transfers were performed in accordance with the
procedures mutually agreed upon by Congress and the DoN.
[Ref. 17]
(4) Ineffective DoD and DoN budget and program
execution. Frustration with individual program management
was not mentioned as a factor in the increased control of
APN. Rather, congressional frustration over the aviation
program sponsor's inability to present what Authorization
and Appropriations Committee staff viewed as reasonable
aircraft acquisition strategy in light of congressionally
defined economic realities, and with DoN budget priorities
prompted the increase in control of the APN account
.
d. Budget growth and control
(1) The significant size of the increment in
the defense budget proposed by the President in the 1980' s.
This may have been a factor in the early years of the Reagan
administration, but by the time the 1988 budget was being
considered it was no longer a contributing factor. A new
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factor, having to deal with cutback management, had become
operative.
(2) Pressure to reduce the growing deficit.
Public pressure to reduce the deficit and the threat of GRH
sequestration forced difficult spending decisions. In the
face of opposing opinions in DoN, Congress felt compelled to
impose its will more forcefully. Hence, statutory line items
were a means of creating budgetary control and enforcing
spending discipline.
D. IMPACT OF THE METHOD OF INCREASED CONTROL
The change in the language of the APN account in the
authorization and appropriation bills had both intended and
unintended consequences. Further, the DoN developed, with
the concurrence of the committees involved, methods of
working around the controls. Finally, the controls were
partially rescinded by Congress in the 1989 authorization
and appropriation bills. However, a different set of
restrictions were written into the FY 1989 Appropriations
Act.
As intended for FY 1988, the language in the bills did
temporarily hinder the ability of the DoN to move funds out
of the 16 specific APN programs. The language did this in
two ways
.
First, the line item format subjected any movement of
funds into or out of these accounts to the statutory
limitations for transfers. Unless transfer authority has
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been specifically granted by statute, no funds may be used
for any purpose other than that provided in the
appropriation bill without congressional approval. Section
8015 of the 1988 Appropriation Act provided the following
transfer authority to the Secretary of Defense for the 1988
budget year.
Upon determination by the Secretary of Defense that
such action is necessary in the national interest, he
may, with the approval of the Office of Management and
Budget, transfer not to exceed $1,500,000,000 of working
capital funds of the Department of Defense or funds made
available in this Act to the Department of Defense for
military funds (except military construction) between
such appropriations or funds or any subdivision thereof,
to be merged with and to be available for the same
purposes, and for the same time period, as the
appropriation or fund to which transferred: Provided,
That such authority to transfer may not be used unless
for higher priority items, based on unforseen military
requirements, than those for which originally
appropriated and in no case where the item for which
funds are requested has been denied by Congress:
Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall
notify the Congress promptly of all transfers made




The line item format prevented moving funds without
exercising this authority or getting specific congressional
approval for each move. Also, many of the reprogrammings
that could be made within the procurement accounts by the
Army and Air Force without using OSD' s transfer authority
could not be made within the DoN' s procurement accounts
.
Because of the addition of more line items to the DoN
procurement accounts, while still appropriating the Army and
Air Force procurement accounts as lump sums, the DoN would
have had to use more than its "fair share" of OSD's transfer
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authority to achieve the same flexibility and discretion in
its budget execution. Second, and very importantly, NAVCOMPT
interpreted the "only for" language as meaning that the
SECDEF could not use transfer authority in the case of these
16 APN programs. [Ref. 23]
An ironic unintended impact was that the control
language reduced the discretion of the program sponsor and
program managers of the very programs that the language was
designed to protect. The impact was felt first when the DoN
distributed a $250,000,000 general reduction in APN mandated
by the 1988 Appropriations Act conference committee report
[Ref. 26 :p. 576] . Rather than having the discretion of
spreading this general reduction over all programs in the
APN account, the reduction had to be absorbed by programs
that had not been specifically fenced by the "only for"
language. The aircraft spares and repair parts budget
activity was forced to absorb the bulk of the general
reduction. Second, even within their own APN account the
program sponsor and program managers were saddled with the
increased transfer controls which hampered their response to
emergent problems, such as structural failure of wings on
operational E-2C aircraft. Rather than being able to handle
this emergent problem with internal reprogrammings the DoN
was forced to seek congressional approval to transfer funds.
[Ref. 25]
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However, most of these intended and unintended impacts
did not materialize. In March 1988 the President submitted
to Congress a supplemental appropriation request which
included a request, originated by NAVCOMPT, that the
specific line item format and "only for" language in the APN
account have no force or effect. The requested relief was
not provided in a supplemental appropriation bill. Rather,
NAVCOMPT and the congressional committees involved reached a
compromise agreement to allow the DoN to transfer up to $10
million out of any of the 16 programs into other programs
without congressional action. [Ref. 27] This was achieved
through a liberal interpretation of Section 8096 of the
appropriation bill which stated that
The Secretary of Defense shall submit a quarterly
report of cumulative reprogrammings from any project or
program in excess of an initial $10,000,000 in total for
procurement and an initial $4,000,000 in total for
research and development. The initial report shall cover
the quarter ending March 31, 1988, and include funds in
this and prior Acts. [Ref. 24]
This, in effect, allowed reductions totalling $1,600,000,000
in the APN account without prior approval from Congress.
And, as noted, the National Defense Authorization and
Department of Defense Appropriations Acts for 1989 partially
rescinded the line item and "only for" provisions of the
1988 acts and provided lump sum appropriations for APN for
budget year 1989. The 1989 Appropriations Act states that
provisions of the 1988 Authorization and Appropriations Acts
"which provide that funds are available in specific dollar
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amounts only for specific programs, projects, or activities
funded by the appropriation "Aircraft Procurement, Navy"
shall have no force or effect which would limit the
application of a proportionate share of the general
reduction of $250,000,000 allocated within the appropriation
account against these specific programs, projects or
activities." [Ref. 28:p. 46] Further, the 1989
Appropriations Act appropriated all funds for DoD
procurement at the account level except SCN and WPN.
However, the conference report reaffirmed and expanded the
committees' control over reprogramming actions and warned
that the "...Committees will not hesitate in the future to
revert to appropriation by budget activity if this
initiative [of appropriation by account] is abused by the
Department." [Ref. 28 :p. 35-36]
A significant impact of this congressional control of
APN was confusion, frustration, and wasted energy within the
DoN and to some extent OSD . The lessons learned from this
experience could be applied to future DoD/Congress
budgeting.
The pluralism in government intended by the framers of
the Constitution was meant to prevent any one person or any
one branch of government from becoming too strong or
autonomous. This was meant to apply at the macro level of
policy and budget decision making. It may not have been
intended that this same frustrating pluralism be present at
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all levels of government. For the DoD and DoN to gain
sufficient consensus to chart a budgetary path and to
establish general policy is difficult enough given the
extensive nature of the mission and the exigencies of world
change. Extending the pluralistic approach characteristic of
congressional micromanagement to the most minute details of
execution is suffocating and increases internal agency
budget competitiveness in ways that likely impede operating
efficiency and effectiveness. The basic institutional issue
is to what extent Congress should attempt to broaden its
control over budget formulation, execution and program




This thesis investigated two major issues: the intent of
Congress in applying increasingly restrictive language in
authorization bills, appropriations bills and the
accompanying committee reports; and the consequences of
increasing congressional control for the ability of the DoN
to effectively and efficiently manage its limited resources.
It concentrated on the changes in language in the DoN
procurement accounts in the Department of Defense
appropriation and authorization acts for the period 1980-
1988 and the Aircraft Procurement, Navy account for budget
year 1988.
The thesis points to four sets of factors which
contributed to the general increase in controls exerted by
Congress over DoD during the period 1980 to 1988:
A. Partisan politics:
1. Within Congress;
2. Between Congress and the Executive.
B. Congressional budgetary politics and processes:
1. Reduced power of committee chairmen and increased
relative power of committee members, subcommittee
chairmen, subcommittee members, and non-committee members;
2
.
Power struggles between standing committees in
both Houses;
3. Pork barrel political pressures;
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4. Increased public exposure for members of Congress;
5. Increased size of congressional committee staffs.
C. Executive accountability:
1. Refusal by high level DoD and DoN officials to
negotiate or prioritize programs in the DoD budget
request;




Failure of DoN to comply with the spirit and
intent of report language;
4. Ineffective DoD and DoN budget and program
execution
.
D. Budget growth and control:
1. The significant size of the increment in the
defense budget proposed by the President in the 1980' s;
2. Pressure to reduce the growing deficit.
It was argued that the main reasons to explain why
Congress chose to exercise greater control over the APN
procurement account for FY 1988 were (i) failure of DoD and
DoN to comply with the spirit and intent of report language,
(ii) the requirement to enforce the difficult spending
decisions dictated by public pressure to reduce the deficit
and the threat of GRH sequestration, and (iii) the view of
congressional staff that NAVCOMPT was exerting undue
influence over the procurement policies in the DoN, at the
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expense of procurement program sponsors and program
managers
.
The thesis concluded that (i) the purpose of increased
oversight and control is to ensure that the intent of
Congress is carried out by the executive branch, (ii) the
impact of congressional oversight and control, given the
detail to which this oversight and control is exercised,
appears to be counterproductive to the achievement of the
ends desired by Congress because the burden of excessive
congressional management often impedes acquisition and
budget execution efficiency and effectiveness, and (iii) the
full impact of such negative consequences did not actually
occur in the specific case of the Aircraft Procurement,
Navy, in fiscal year 1988 only because Navy executives
negotiated with the committees with the result that Congress
partially rescinded the controls.
Although the controls for the APN procurement account
were partially rescinded, the line item controls still exist
for budget year 1988, and the Appropriations Committees have
reaffirmed and enhanced their reprogramming controls. The
APN appropriation is a three year appropriation and this
thesis was written during the first year of execution.
Consequently, further research on the impact of the controls
is necessary and should concentrate on the budget year 1988
APN account to assess the overall impact of these controls
on Don's ability to effectively and efficiently execute the
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APN procurement budget over the three year life of the
appropriation. Research to document the negative impact of
these controls should be of some priority to the DoN.
It is important, also, to examine the potential impact
of continued congressional micromanagement on the ability of
DoD and DoN officials to exercise effective leadership over
their departments. Congressional micromanagement, coupled
with congressional encouragement of end runs around the
defense and service secretaries and service chiefs, erodes
their authority and effectiveness. This erosion of authority
leads to increased confusion and mismanagement within the
departments and further pressure for congressional
intervention. How can this self-perpetuating cycle be
reversed to the benefit of both executive and legislative
interests?
Perhaps further research should accept the permanence of
the forces of partisan politics and congressional budgetary
politics and processes as a given, and concentrate on the
interaction of DoN with the authorization and appropriation
committees, particularly on the causes of distrust and loss
of confidence. Even if distrust and loss of confidence are
unwarranted, the causes for these perceptions warrant
investigation. Is the DoN justifying one budget and
executing another? Is the FYDP being used simply as a
budgeting ploy or is it the central document produced by
programming to guide budgeting? Are program decisions made
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by the proper organizations within DoN? Is DoD distrust of
Congress impeding effective, constructive dialogue between
DoN leadership and Congressional committees? A strategy
designed to restore DoN leadership authority and cause a








Students at the Naval Postgraduate School
Department of Administrative Sciences
Masters Degree, Financial Management Curriculum
Working with Professor L. R. Jones on public policy
analysis in the area of budget formulation and execution.
In particular the role of Congress in controlling DOD
procurement
.
Confirm interviewee's name, position, area of
responsibility, some background, and time available for the
interview.
Ask if we may use a tape recorder to help take notes.




How Does Congress perform its oversight and control
responsibilities over DOD acquisitions or procurement?
From your experience do think that there has been
any change in the way that Congress performs its oversight
and control responsibilities over DOD acquisitions or
procurement over the past decade?
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Has the degree of oversight or control by Congress
over the DON budget changed?
If so, in what direction?
In what ways have these changes occurred?





Who initiated these changes?
Were there specific problems that prompted these
changes?
What were the desired effects of these changes?
Were the desired effects achieved?
Were there any unintended or undesirable
consequences?
Were these changes beneficial or counterproductive
for the DON?
In what ways do you expect the methods and degree of
Congressional control and oversight to change in the future?
What factors will influence this change?
Conclusion
:
Thank you for your time and cooperation.




To ensure that various parties were fairly represented,
interview subjects were chosen from the staffs of the
following major participants in the budgeting and execution
process for DoD procurement:
Appropriations and Authorization Committees 9
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy 9
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller 4
Office of Management and Budget 2
Congressional Budget Office 3
Naval Air Systems Command 2
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare) 4
Office of Legislative Affairs, Navy 1
Those chosen were responsible for DoD or DoN procurement
issues. The bulk of the interviews were conducted in person





Excerpts from Letters Written by William H. Taft, IV
The following are excerpts from letters written by
William H. Taft, IV, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the
chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees
of the House and Senate.
Reprogramming Restrictions : The Senate included a
new provision (Section 8090) that not more than $10
million in total for procurement and $4 million in total
for RDT&E may be cumulatively reprogrammed from any
project or program without prior notification, 30 days
in advance, to the Defense Subcommittees of the
Committees on Appropriations. The House did not include
a similar provision. Implementation of this restriction
will create a substantial administrative burden on both
the Congress and the Department. For example, if this
new language had been in effect during FY 1987, roughly
an additional 215 reprogramming actions would have been
processed through the congressional committees. This
includes 75 actions that would be required when project
level versus program element level is applied to RDT&E.
Also requiring reporting at the project level would
increase line items in the Base for Reprogramming
Actions report (DD 1414) for RDT&E accounts from
approximately 750 to 1900. Reprogramming actions
currently not requiring congressional approval are
identified in a semiannual Report of Programs (DD 1416)
.
Some decreases made to programs that are identified in
the DD 1416 are due solely to allocating, by line item,
undistributed general reductions made by the Congress.
Enactment of this general provision would hamper
efficient program management and prevent quick response
to ever changing program requirements thereby causing
program delays and increased costs. I strongly support




Sub-divided Appropriations : The House bill provides
for sub-divided appropriations at the budget activity
and other specified levels in several of the procurement
accounts. The Senate bill provides lump sum
appropriations. The House language would result in
numerous formal reprogramming actions, impede timely
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program execution, generate increased workload for DoD
and Congressional staffs, and impair the Department's
ability to respond to crisis situations. The Department
strongly supports the Senate account structure. [Ref,
16: End. 1, p. 2]
Line Item Authorization : The House proposes that
appropriations for Aircraft Procurement, Navy; Weapons
Procurement, Navy; and Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy
be authorized by line item. Appropriations for Other
Procurement, Army; Other Procurement, Navy; and Other
Procurement, Air Force are proposed for authorization by
budget activity or group of budget activities. The
Senate recommends procurement authorization in lump sum
for each appropriation, as requested by the Department.
The House proposal would provide only a marginal
increase in program oversight for the Congress, while
substantially limiting the Department's flexibility to
develop, manage, and execute acquisition initiatives and
contracts in an effective and efficient manner. The
Department requires the flexibility to react to
emergent, time-sensitive unfunded requirements,
accommodate program repricing, and conduct the
procurement process in an efficient, economical manner.
Reprogrammings currently are provided to all four
committees when a procurement line item increases by
over $10 million, and new action starts are constrained
at an even lower funding level, The House action would
further limit the small amount of reprogramming and
financing flexibilities that are afforded the
Department, thus resulting in numerous, additional
reprogramming actions for minor changes. I urge support
for the Senate position to authorize these
appropriations in lump sum amounts
.
[Ref . 29:p. 18]
Limitation on Availability of Funds : The House
proposed a provision (Section 824), which prohibits
obligation or expenditure, for any purpose, of any
amount appropriated for any program, project, or
activity (PPA) that is in excess of the amount needed to
carry out that PPA. The Senate did not propose similar
language. The House proposal to eliminate the
Department's reprogramming authority between PPAs will
seriously impact the Department's ability to manage its
financial resources effectively, and ultimately could
jeopardize national security. Procurement quantities
will have to be reduced when costs increase, even though
savings may be available in other PPAs that might
otherwise have been reprogrammed to protect program
quantities in such instances. The House proposal will
eliminate the Department's capability to respond to
crisis situations, changes in defense priorities,
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changes in the threat, or to fluctuations in the cost of
DoD requirements. The Department's acquisition process,
which the Congress has sought to streamline and make
more efficient, will be unable to respond to even minor
cost fluctuations without resorting to program
reductions. The Department could find itself unable to
accommodate cost growth on executed contracts and be
unable to complete contractual payments. I urge the





Excerpts from Applicable Acts
A. EXCERPT FROM THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1988 AND 1989.
TITLE I—PROCUREMENT
PART A—FUNDING AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 102. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS
(a) AIRCRAFT.
(1) Funds are hereby authorized to be
appropriated for procurement of aircraft for the Navy as
follows
:
(A) $9,604,987,000 ($8,610,118,000) for
fiscal year 1988.
(B) $5,591,525,000 for fiscal year 1989.
(2) Of the funds appropriated or otherwise made
available for procurement of aircraft for the Navy for
fiscal year 1988:
(A) $5,387,322,000 ($4,956,739,000) is
available only for combat aircraft programs as follows:
For the A-6E program, $376,610,000 ($0).
For the EA-6B program, $521,571,000.
For the F-14A/D program, $873,848,000.
For the FA-18 program, $2,580,222,000.
For the SH-60B program, $197,614,000
($143, 641, 000)
.
For the SH-60F program, $329,961,000.
For the long-range air ASW capable
aircraft program, $80,200,000.
For the E-2C program, $427,296,000.
(B) $833,193,000 ($800,493,000) is available
only for modification of aircraft programs as follows:
For the A-6 series, $219,651,000.
For the H-2 series, $45,108,000.
For the P-3 series, $172,865,000.
For the S-3 series, $142,522,000.
For the ES-3 series, $115,200,000.
For the E-2 series, $71,139,000
($38,439,000)
.
For common electronic countermeasures
(ECM) equipment, $66,708,000. [Ref. 30]
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B. EXCERPT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS
ACT, 1988
AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, NAVY
For construction, procurement, production,
modification, and modernization of aircraft, equipment,
including ordnance, spare parts, and accessories
therefor; specialized equipment; expansion of public and
private plants, including the land necessary therefor,
and such lands and interests therein, may be acquired,
and construction prosecuted thereon prior to approval of
title; and procurement and installation of equipment,
appliances, and machine tools in public and private
plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-
owned equipment layaway; $9,522,299,000, to remain
available for obligation until September 30, 1990:
Provided, That with regard to programs, projects and
activities funded by this appropriation, provisions of
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years
1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180) which provide that
funds appropriated pursuant to such Act shall be
available only for specific programs, projects and
activities in specific dollar amounts shall be







Long Range ASW Capable Aircraft Program, $0;
E-2C Program, $380,195,000;
A-6E Modification Series, $219,478,000;
H-53 Modification Series, $22,737,000;
H-2 Modification Series, $55,000,000;
P-3 Modification Series, $136,865,000;
S-3 Modification Series, $74,722,000;
ES-3 Modification Series, $80,000,000;
E-2 Modification Series, $39,639,000;
Common ECM equipment, $16,708,000:
Provided further. That notwithstanding section 111 (e) of
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years
1988 and 1989 (Public Law 100-180) $609,917,000 is
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